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ABSTRACT
Smart citiesmust integrate a number of interdependent cyber-physical
systems that operate in a coordinated manner to improve the well-
being of the city’s residents. A cyber-physical system (CPS) is a sys-
tem of computational elements controlling physical entities. Large-
scale CPSs aremore vulnerable to aacks due to the cyber-physical
interdependencies that can lead to cascading failures which can
have a signicant detrimental eect on a city. In this paper, a novel
approach is proposed for analyzing the problem of allocating secu-
rity resources, such as rewalls and anti-malware, over the var-
ious cyber components of an interdependent CPS to protect the
system against imminent aacks. e problem is formulated as a
Colonel Bloo game in which the aacker seeks to allocate its re-
sources to compromise the CPS, while the defender chooses how
to distribute its resources to defend against potential aacks. To
evaluate the eects of defense and aack, various CPS factors are
considered including human-CPS interactions as well as physical
and topological characteristics of a CPS such as ow and capacity
of interconnections and minimum path algorithms. Results show
that, for the case in which the aacker is not aware of the CPS in-
terdependencies, the defender can have a higher payo, compared
to the case in which the aacker has complete information. e re-
sults also show that, in the case of more symmetric nodes, due to
interdependencies, the defender achieves its highest payo at the
equilibrium compared to the case with independent, asymmetric
nodes.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Smart cities encompass amultitudeof cyber-physical systems (CPSs),
such as smart grids and smart transportation systems, that are crit-
ical to enhancing municipal services and reducing living costs for
residents [1, 12, 14]. One key feature of CPSs is the strong syn-
ergy between their cyber and physical functions. For instance, the
compromise of a communication node in a transportation system
can have a direct physical impact on the involved vehicles. us,
modeling and analyzing failures across an interdependent CPS in
a smart city is a problem of critical and global importance [3] and
[9]. Protecting CPSs faces numerous challenges such as interde-
pendence between cyber and physical failures, modeling the key
functional characteristics of a CPS, and appropriately responding
to CPS aacks.
Recently, the security of CPSs has received signicant aen-
tion in the existing literature [3–7, 9, 10, 12–16]. e rst body
of work in [5, 13, 16] focused on the game-theoretic analysis of
CPS security. e authors in [5] formulated a three-stage Colonel
Bloo game with hierarchical information structure, in which two
players ght against a common adversary and have presented this
game as an applicable model to cyber vulnerability in power sys-
tems. In [16], the authors studied a resilient control problem, in
which control packets transmied over a network are corrupted
by a human adversary. A Stackelberg game is proposed to stabi-
lize the control system despite the aack. In [13], the equilibrium
of a heterogeneous Bloo game is investigated for asymmetric bat-
tleelds having dierent values.
Beyond game-theoretic analysis, recent works such as [4] have
also analyzed the control-theoretic aspect of CPS security. In [10],
the authors proposed general models for defenders and probable
aacks to a CPS. By using graph theory, the components of CPSs
were modeled with the vertices being physical or cyber elements
and the graph edges being interconnections. In [12] and [9], the
authors studied bad data injection aacks in a smart grid and an-
alyzed the impact of such aacks on the physical side of the grid.
ework in [6] presented amodel-based design methodologywith
the focus on physical properties by the case study of a tunneling
ball device. In [15], a general CPS model with cascading failures is
studied. However, despite being interesting, these existing works
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[4–6, 10, 13, 15, 16] do not explicitly consider the interdependen-
cies of cyber and physical elements during security resource alloca-
tion. Moreover, this body of work has not considered the topologi-
cal characteristics when analyzing security threats on CPSs. More-
over, existing game-theoretic studies such as in [13] did not take
into account the eects of nodes on each other. Also, the game anal-
ysis in [13] ignores the physical characteristics of the CPS nodes.
e main contribution of this paper is to introduce a novel ap-
proach, based on the Colonel Bloo game [8], to allocate security
resources across the interdependent elements of a CPS within a
smart city. In particular, we use graph theory to model the ele-
ments of a CPS as connected nodes. In this model, we explicitly
take into account human-CPS interaction, the load carried over a
CPS, as well as the ow and capacities of interconnections. en,
we formulate the security resource allocation problem as a Colonel
Bloo game between a defender and an aacker. In this game, the
aacker seeks to compromise most of the physical nodes by allo-
cating its aack resources over the cyber nodes to maximize its
payo while the defender aims to minimize the number of com-
promised nodes to minimize its loss. For this game, we investigate
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE) and the payo for each
player for two cases: a case in which the aacker is aware of in-
terdependencies and a case in which it is not aware of those inter-
dependencies. en, we prove that, under a symmetric game, the
defender’s payo is higher at the NE compared to the asymmetric
game. Simulation results assess the various properties of the game
and the impact of aack and defense on the CPS, under dierent
scenarios.
e rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
the studied CPS model. In Section III, the Colonel Bloo formula-
tion is presented. In Section IV, simulation results and a case study
are presented while Section V draws some conclusions.
2 SYSTEMMODEL AND PROBLEM
FORMULATION
2.1 Cyber-Physical System Model
To model a general CPS, we use four common features that are
found across a wide range of CPSs [14], [6], and [11]:
• Load: e load that is delivered from a point in a physical
network to another point such as power in smart grids or
vehicles in a transportation system.
• Flow: e ow is the rate of load which is transmied
over interconnections. Examples include the number of
cars passing a street at, the rate of food entity transmis-
sion from dierent devices in an automated factory, or the
power delivery rate in power systems.
• Capacity: e maximum capacity of ow is a key CPS pa-
rameter that is determined by physical limitations within
a CPS such as themaximum speed of cars or themaximum
power transmission in power systems.
• Human Interaction: Humans inuence a CPS by being a
part of its physical system or being served by it within a
smart city. Human interactions, are, thus, a key feature
needed to assess the importance of nodes in a CPS.
Given these features, a CPS can be modeled as a network of com-
puting and cyber elements which are controlling a network of phys-
ical system. Hereinaer, we use term “node” to describe both cyber
and physical elements. In addition, each physical system in a CPS
consists of three main types of elements: one reference node as
well as a number of main nodes and ordinary nodes. Practical ex-
amples include slack, PV, and PQ buses in power systems [11] and
central square or subway station and the surrounding stations in a
concentric city design such as in the Berlin subway system. In our
model, we suppose that each physical node is controlled by one
cyber node. en, the graphical representations of physical and
cyber systems will be analogous.
2.2 Value of each node in a CPS
Each cyber node has a value depending on its level of interaction
with the humans in the CPS. Meanwhile, each physical element can
be monitored or operated by actual individuals. Finding practical
values that capture the importance of each CPS node will facilitate
the analysis. We consider the human-CPS interaction as an appro-
priate feature to determine the value of any given CPS node. ere-
fore, to characterize the interactions between humans and the CPS,
we consider the population level. In particular, the presence of a
larger population at a physical node results in more interactions
between individuals and the CPS. us, we can assume that the
nodes which are located in the downtown area of a city have more
human interaction than others. Here, we let hi be the fraction of
human interaction at node i out of the total human interactions at
all of the nodes in the physical system. In a concentric design, hi
will be a function of the distance from the most populated points
of the city. Given this model, next, we characterize how the fail-
ure of a particular node will impact the entire system, and then we
use that characterization to dene a parameter that represents the
interdependencies of the CPS nodes. Such a parameter will then
capture the dependence between cyber and physical elements.
For the physical system of our CPS, we consider a set N of n
physical nodes. Here, we assume that the total input ow to each
physical node is equal to the output ow of this node, except in
the marginal nodes of the system. Moreover, since a physical sys-
tem can extend over a vast area and physical nodes are relatively
distant from one another, we assume that a failure in a physical
node can only impact the ow in nearby nodes. In the considered
CPS, the total ow of the system should be maintained as constant
following any failure or aack. Also, the direction of the ow will
be one-sided and starts from the reference node towards ordinary
nodes.
Next, we present a method to analyze the eect of the failure
of a physical node on the entire physical system. We introduce a
matrix ann×nmatrix F to represent the ow of the edges between
each pair of nodes. Each element , fi j , of F is positive if, for two
connected nodes, node i is closer than node j to the reference node
and it is zero otherwise. erefore, the positive elements in row j
are the nodes which are being supplied with the ow from node
i and the positive elements in column i are the nodes which are
supplying node i . Aer a failure in node i both column i and row
i will have only zero elements. en, we let F i be a matrix which
is identical to F but where its column i and row i are zero.
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To start analyzing the eect of changing column i and row i to
zero (which implies that there is no input or output ow in node i
of the failed system), rst, we dene two sets of nodes: rst-order
distant nodes which are directly connected to node i , N i1 = {j ∈
N | fi j > 0 ∪ fji > 0} and second-order distant nodes which are
connected to the rst-order distance nodes of i ,N i2 = {k ∈ N |∀j ∈
N i1 , fk j > 0 ∪ fjk > 0}. To characterize the eect of a failure at
node i , we start with the set of nodes in N i1 which are supplied
by node i which is denoted by Mi = {j ∈ N | fi j > 0} and, thus
Mi ⊆ N i1 . e analysis can proceeds as follows:
(1) We choose nodes in Mi which are not connected to any
other nodes in this set or {j ∈ Mi |k ∈ Mi , fjk > 0}.
(2) We nd the amount of increase in the ow of whole of the
connected edges to node j aer a failure in node i :
n∑
k=1,k,i
δk j = fi j +
©­«
n∑
k=1,k,i
fjk −
n∑
k=1,k,i
fk j
ª®¬ . (1)
e new ows (f new
k j
,k , i) will be given by:
f new
k j
=

ck j , if fk j >
∑n
k=1,k,i
dk j ,
fk j +
dk j∑n
k=1,k,i dk j
×∑n
k=1,k,i
δk j , otherwise,
(2)
where ck j , fk j , dk j and δk j are, respectively, the capac-
ity, ow, dierence between the current ow and capacity,
and dierence between the ow before and aer a failure.
(3) Aer computing the new ows, the nodes inMi are omit-
ted and the same analyze of step 1) is applied toMinew =
Mi − {j ∈ Mi |k ∈ Mi , fjk > 0}. ese iterations con-
tinue until {j ∈ Mi |k ∈ Mi , fjk > 0} = ∅.
(4) e set of nodes such that {j ∈ Mi |k ∈ Mi , fk j > 0}
are choosen and the same approach of step 2) and 3) is
applied to this set. is will proceed until {j ∈ Mi |k ∈
Mi , fk j > 0} = ∅.
(5) e nal step is to choose the set of nodes such that {j ∈
N i2 |k ∈ N
i
2 , fk j > 0} and we nd new ows for them as
in 2) and 3).
is process continues until {j ∈ N i2 |k ∈ N
i
2 , fk j > 0} = ∅.
Once the above approach is completed, we can nd the total input
and output loss of ow , f ij , at a given physical node j following
the failure of node i as follows:
f ij =
n∑
k=1
fjk −
n∑
k=1,k,i
f new
jk
. (3)
Now, we can dene eect of the failure of node i on node j in
the physical system as the fraction of its failure loss to the total
ow of node j before the failure as follows:
eji =
f ij∑n
k=1
fjk
= 1 −
∑n
k=1,k,i
f new
jk∑n
k=1
fjk
, (4)
where eji is the failure eect of node i on the physical node j.
Next, we analyze the eect of the failure of a cyber node on the
cyber system. We consider that each physical node is being con-
trolled by one cyber node. Unlike the physical system, the distance
between the nodes is not a limitation here. However, the failure in
one cyber node can aect all of the cyber nodes, since cyber nodes
are connected through communication links and exhibit a lower
delay than in the case of physical links.
Here, we use the shortest path among the nodes to nd a value
for each cyber node. Note that due to the one-to-one model, the set
of cyber nodes isN similar to the physical nodes. us, we nd all
pairs of shortest path solutions for the set of nodesN andN − {i}.
en, we nd the increase in the summation of all pairs of shortest
paths aer removing a cyber node from the cyber network. We
assume that each pair of the nodes inN has the minimum pathpjk
and each pair inN−{i} has theminimum pathpi
jk
. Also, removing
a node from the cyber network increases the computational load
at each node. If we denote the entire load of computations in the
cyber network by CL , then the calculations per each node will be
CL
n where n is the number of all the cyber nodes. We, then dene
the ratio of the value of each cyber node to that of other nodes in
the cyber network based on the failure eect on each:
tji =
∑N
k=1,k,i
pi
jk∑N
k=1
pjk
− 1 + t0. (5)
In (5), we can see that each node has a minimum eect of t0 on
any other node due to the increase in the computational load on
every node aer a failure at a specic node.
As mentioned earlier, in addition to the value of each node, we
can assign a value for the interconnection between two nodes. In
this context, any failure in each of the cyber or physical nodes will
aect both the cyber and physical components of the CPS. ere-
fore, we dene the eect of failure on the whole system using the
parameters that we have dened thus far, and we refer to it as the
interdependency parameter between two cyber nodes i and j:
vji = αe
′
ji + βt
′
ji . (6)
where e ′ji and t
′
ji are normalized eji and tji respectively and α+β =
1, with both α and β being positive constants for normalizing the
interconnection parameter.
2.3 Problem Denition
CPSs are vulnerable to aacks in both cyber and physical realms.
Further, the interdependencies between the physical and cyber el-
ements as captured by (6) increase the potential of aacks to the
CPS rendering it more arduous to be defended. In our model, we
consider an aacker that is distributing aack resources such as
malware and trojan horses over the cyber nodes to compromise
the CPS and exploit its interdependencies.
While the aacker tries to allocate its restricted destructive re-
sources over the cyber nodes, the owner of the CPS will act as
a defender that seeks to optimally allocate its defense resources
such as anti-viruses and malware detectors to prevent the aacker
from causing a long-lasting failure on the system. Also, due to the
varying importance of each CPS node and the intensity of inter-
dependencies among the nodes, analyzing how the aacker and
defender will interact over the CPS and allocate their resources
is a challenging CPS problem that we study here using the game-
theoretic Colonel Bloo framework [8].
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3 GAME FORMULATION AND SOLUTION
To model the security resource allocation problem in a CPS, we
consider the interactions between the defender, referred to as player
D, and the aacker, referred to as player A, using the powerful
framework of a Colonel Bloo game [8]. is framework studies
the interactions between two generals that seek to allocate limited
resources across a number of baleelds. e general that ends
up with more resources in a given baleeld will win it. In the
classical Bloo game, the winner is the general who wins the most
baleelds. Here, we exploit this analogy between the Bloo game
and our CPS security resource allocation problem, and we consider
that the defender and aacker interact over the cyber nodes of the
CPS, which are hereinaer referred to as baleelds. Unlike the clas-
sical Bloo game in[2], our game has asymmetric values for the
baleelds. Moreover, the interdependence between baleelds,
due to the CP interconnections, renders our problem signicantly
dierent from the classical Bloo models such as in [6].
e number of baleelds in our game is n which is the num-
ber of nodes in the cyber network. e total amount of resources
available for the defender and aacker are RD ∈ R+ and RA ∈ R+,
respectively with RD ≥ RA. A particular allocation by player
p ∈ {A,D} is dened by the non-negative n-dimensional vector
r
p := [r
p
1 , r
p
2 , . . . , r
p
n ] where r
p
m ≥ 0 is the amount of resources al-
located to them-th baleeld by player p. us, the set of feasible
allocations for defender and aacker, Bp , are
Bp :=
{
r
p ∈ Rn
+
 n∑
m=1
r
p
m = R
p
}
. (7)
While a pure strategy for player p would be a deterministic choice
between one of the cases in Bp , a mixed strategy for player p is de-
ned as the n-variate joint distribution function Fp : R
n
+
→ [0, 1]
with support in Bp . is mixed strategy presents the probability
of allocating a fraction of Rp over each of the baleelds. Note
that any joint distribution may be broken into a set of univariate
marginal distribution functions. To determine the utility function
of the players, we will take into account the CPS model and param-
eters dened in Section II. As mentioned previously, the aacker
tries to disrupt the functioning of a CPS by compromising its cy-
ber nodes. Each baleeld has a constant value based on human
interaction which we refer to as hi and there exists n baleelds.
Also, in this game each baleeld will have an eect on other bat-
tleelds, and hence winning a baleeld leads to gain from other
baleelds. However, the aacker has no information about the in-
terconnections. e utility achieved by the defender for protecting
each baleeld will be:
uDi (r
D
i , r
A
i ) =
{
дi , if r
D
i > r
A
i ,
0, otherwise,
(8)
where дi is:
дi =
hi +
∑n
i=j, j,i vjihj∑n
i=1(hi +
∑n
i=j, j,i vjihj )
. (9)
For the aacker, as it has no information about the interdependen-
cies, the utility will be:
uAi (r
A
i , r
D
i ) =
{
hi if r
A
i > r
D
i ,
0, otherwise.
(10)
en, the payos for the defender and aacker are given by:
πD
(
r
D
, {GA,i }
n
i=1
)
=
n∑
i=1
дiGA,i (r
D
i ), (11)
πA
(
r
A
, {GD,i }
n
i=1
)
=
n∑
i=1
hiGD,i (r
A
i ). (12)
Here, the marginal distribution functions of each baleeld are
Gp,i where p is the player index and i is the index of the baleeld.
ese marginal distribution functions capture the probability of
allocating a particular fraction of resources over each one of the
baleelds. Each player tries to maximize its expected payo, and
therefore solving the Bloo game reduces to nding Gp,i .
In [8], a general solution for the continuous Bloo game with
asymmetric baleelds was presented. Asymmetric baleelds as
in our case imply baleelds that lead to dierent gains for the
player that wins them. It is proved in [8] that, for an aacker and
defender with hi and дi as the value of baleelds, marginal distri-
bution functions that maximize the payos will be:
GA,i (r ) =
©­«
дi
λD
− hi
λA
дi
λD
ª®¬ + rдiλD r ∈
[
0,
hi
λA
]
, (13)
GD,i (r ) =
r
hi
λA
r ∈
[
0,
hi
λA
]
, (14)
where λp is themultiplier on player p’s resource expenditure. Also,
to nd these variables, we must take into account the budget con-
straint in (7) which yields:
∑
i ∈ΩA
дi
2λD
+
∑
i<ΩA
(
hi
λA
)2
2
(
дi
λD
) = RA, (15)
∑
i ∈ΩA
(
дi
λD
)2
2
(
hi
λA
) + ∑
i<ΩA
hi
2λA
= RD , (16)
where ΩA denotes the set of baleelds in which
hi
дi
>
λA
λD
. To
nd λA and λD , rst, we dene µ ≡
λA
λD
and by then by taking the
ration of (15) to (16), we will have:
µ3
∑
i ∈ΩA
(дi )
2
hi
− µ2
RD
RA
∑
i ∈ΩA
дi + µ
∑
i<ΩA
hi −
RD
RA
∑
i<ΩA
(hi )
2
дi
= 0.
(17)
In [8], it is shown that for each solution of (13) and (14) there
exists only one Nash equilibrium. (17) does not have a general
closed-form solution as it depends on the values of hiдi . However,
next, we solve this equation for a special case of interest to the CPS
problem at hand.
4 ANALYSIS AND NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR
CPS WITH INTERDEPENDENCIES
4.1 Analytical Results
First, we will study the solution of (17) for a particular case in
which the interdependencies only alter the value of the node with
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the maximum human-CPS interaction. Let hm and hl be, respec-
tively, the maximum and minimum human interaction. In the case
of maximum дi , we have:
max {дi } =
hm + hl
1 + hl
. (18)
is happens if vji = 1, if i = m, and j = l and 0, otherwise. is
means that failure in the node with the maximum human interac-
tion results in compromising the node with lowest human interac-
tion and has no eects on other nodes. For the case of maximum
feasible дi , we will have:
hi
дi
=
{
hl (l+hl )
hl+hm
, if i =m,
1 + hl , otherwise.
(19)
In this case, to solve (17), we have three conditions for µ: µ ≥
1 + hl ,
hl (l+hl )
hl+hm
≤ µ < 1 + hl , and µ <
hl (l+hl )
hl+hm
. Next, we consider
µ ≤ 1 + hl to analyze the increase in the payo for the defender
if we compare the condition of no information to the condition of
complete information of interdependency for aacker.
Theorem 4.1. At equilibrium, compared to the case in which it
has complete information, the expected payo for the defender in-
creases if: a) the aacker has no information about the interdepen-
dencies, b) дi =
hm+hl
1+hl
if i = m and hi
1+hl
, otherwise, and c) µ ≤
1 + hl . In this case, the payo of the aacker remains constant.
Proof. If µ ≤ 1 + hl , then ΩA = ∅ and (17) will become:
µ∗1
∑
i<ΩA
hi −
RD
RA
∑
i<ΩA
(hi )
2
дi
= 0,
µ∗1 −
RD
RA
©­«
n∑
i=1i,m
©­« (hi )
2
hi
1+hl
ª®¬ + (hm)
2
hm+hl
1+hl
ª®¬ = 0,
µ∗1 =
RD
RA
(
(1 + hl ) (1 − hm) + (1 + hl )
(
(hm)
2
hm + hl
))
,
µ∗1 =
RD
RA
(
(1 + hl )
(
hm + hl − hmhl
hm + hl
))
. (20)
Now, to check the condition of above solution we have:
µ∗1 ≥ 1 + hl ,
RD
RA
(
hm + hl − hmhl
hm + hl
)
≥ 1,
RD
RA
≥
hm + hl
hm + hl − hmhl
. (21)
(21) is the condition to have the µ∗1 as a valid solution for (17). If
µ∗1 satises its condition, then λA and λD are obtainable as:
λA =
1
2RD
, λD =
1
2RA
hm + hl
(1 + hl ) (hm + hl − hmhl )
. (22)
en, the expected payos for defender and aacker at Nash equi-
librium are:
πA =
RA
2RD
,πD = 1 +
RD − 2RA
2RD
hm + hl
(1 + hl ) (hm + hl − hmhl )
. (23)
Also, when the aacker has complete information, one can easily
show that the payos for both players are:
πA =
RA
2RD
,πD = 1 −
RA
2RD
. (24)
Table 1: Human Interaction of interdependent and indepen-
dent nodes
i hi дi for case 1 дi for case 2 дi for case 3
1 0.2667 0.3282 0.2406 0.2388
2 0.1333 0.1221 0.2180 0.1194
3 0.1333 0.1221 0.1203 0.1194
4 0.1333 0.1221 0.1203 0.1194
5 0.0667 0.0611 0.0602 0.0597
6 0.0667 0.0611 0.0602 0.0597
7 0.0667 0.0611 0.0602 0.0597
8 0.0667 0.0611 0.0602 0.0597
9 0.0667 0.0611 0.0602 0.1641
Def. Payo 0.8 0.8034 0.8081 0.8130
At. Payo 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
By comparing (24) with (23), we can see that the defender gains
more in the case of no information for the aacker, however, the
aacker’s payo remains constant.
4.2 Numerical Case Study
Next, in addition to the mathematical analysis, we will dene hu-
man interaction, capacity and ows of interconnections, and min-
imum path parameters for a CPS and we will numerically analyze
the eect of vi j as given by (6). For our simulations, we consider
a CPS with 9 cyber nodes controlling 9 physical nodes as in Fig-
ure . Also, we consider three levels of values for the nodes. e
reference node will have the highest value, followed by the main
nodes, and nally the ordinary nodes. As mentioned earlier, we
assume that hi depends on the distance from the reference node
and it is also equal for all the nodes at the same level. erefore,
in Figure , h1 = 3h4 = 5h7. e second column of Table 1 shows
the human interactions of each node. All simulations pertain to
the case in which RDRA = 2.5.
In Table I, we consider a system in which the interdependen-
cies lead to an increase in the value of only one node at each level
while decreasing the values of all other CPS nodes. Here, we con-
sider three cases, shown in Table 1. In each case we just increase
the value of only one node in one level and decrease all the other
values. e payos in Table 1 show that, in case 3, the defender’s
payo increases more than in the other cases due to the more sym-
metric values for дi .
Next, we analyze the system by increasing the ows of inter-
connections. Figure 1 shows that, as the ratio of ow to capacity
at each interconnection increases, the payo for the defender in-
creases, however, the payo for the aacker remains constant. As
the ratio of ows to capacities increases, all the values for дi be-
come less asymmetric which, for our CPS, correspond to a value
of 19 .
Figure 2 shows that as the nodes become more symmetric, the
payo of the defender increases. However, the aacker’s payo
remains constant. From Figure 2, we can see that, as the nodes
become more symmetric, the defender’s payo increases up to 6%
compared to the case in which the system has more.
Furthermore, to analyze how the interdependencies impact the
allocation of resources, we calculate the probability of allocating
resources over three nodes from three dierent levels of human in-
teraction proportional to their value. Figure 3 shows that as nodes
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Figure 1: Ratio between the payos in the game with no in-
formation and the game with complete information, as the
ratio between ows and capacities varies.
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Figure 2: Ratio of player’s payos in the incomplete infor-
mation case to the case with complete information, as the
nodes become less asymmetric.
become more symmetric, both aacker and defender tend to allo-
cate resources proportional to their value with higher probability
to the node with lower human interaction. Note that, a decrease
in deviation of дi captures the increase in the interdependencies.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel framework for analyz-
ing the security of a CPS with interdependent cyber and physi-
cal nodes. In particular, we have modeled the interdependencies
using notions of ow capacity and minimum path. en, for the
modeled system, we have formulated a novel Colonel Bloo game
in which an aacker seeks to compromise the CPS by allocating its
destructive resources on cyber nodes, and a defender aims to pro-
tect the CPS by allocating defensive resources. For this game, we
have analyzed the equilibrium strategies, and we have shown var-
ious properties for the particular case in which interdependencies
only increase the value of reference node. Simulation results have
also shown that, for the general game, the defender can increase
its payo in the case of high interdependency and no information
for aacker.
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